

Get Rich or Die Trying

"Making money on the Web, the black hat way"

Arian Evans
Director of Operations
WhiteHat Security

Blackhat Tokyo
09.2008



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
Contributing author of "Hacking Exposed: Web Applications."

WhiteHat Sentinel

- **Unlimited Assessments** – customer controlled and expert managed – the ability to scan websites no matter how big or how often they change
- **Coverage** – authenticated scans to identify technical vulnerabilities and custom testing to uncover business logical flaws
- **Virtually Eliminate False Positives** – Operations Team verifies results and assigns the appropriate severity and threat rating
- **Development and QA** – WhiteHat Satellite Appliance allows us to service intranet accessible systems remotely
- **Improvement & Refinement** – real-world scans enable fast and efficient updates




The other half of the Top Ten




Percentage likelihood that a website has a particular vulnerability by class

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3-5 years XSS, SQLi, and CSRF probably on the way out

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Online Ballot Stuffing for Fame and Fortune

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In response to an Austin beagle winning the Westminster Dog Show, the Austin American Statesman newspaper held an online poll (Austin's Best in Show) for Central Texas (grouped by breed). Thousands submitted photos and voted on their favorite underdogs.

The image shows a screenshot of the Statesman Dog Show website. The main headline is "STATESMAN DOG SHOW" with a sub-headline "Calling all pug owners". A photo of a pug in a green sweater is featured. To the right, there is a section titled "Think you have Central Texas' top dog?" with a photo of a dog. Below the pug photo, there is a poll titled "Vote on Austin's best Chihuahua". The poll shows a photo of a Chihuahua named "Tiny at Lake" and a progress bar indicating that 82% of voters chose "Yes" and 18% chose "No". The poll is credited to "Oliver Wong".

statesman.com

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FOLLOWER for FABULOUS accessory ideas

ASSOCIATED PRESS ENTERTAINMENT STORES

MOVIES TV MUSIC OTHER

STATESMAN DOG SHOW

Calling all pug owners

Think you have Central Texas' top dog?

An Austin beagle named Lily won the Westminster Dog Show's top honor. Now we want your dog nominated! When Lily was in the headlines, we asked for photos of your beagles. Thousands of people submitted and voted on their favorite underdogs among the breed.

That inspired us to start a contest to search for Austin's Best in Show.

Every two weeks, we'll feature one of Austin's most popular breeds, ask for your photos if you have a dog that is that breed - and allow statesman.com viewers to then vote on their favorite pooches. Each breed

You've got pamperin' fun!

Vote on Austin's best Chihuahua

← Back 35 of 479 Next →

Tiny at Lake

Is this Austin's best Chihuahua?

Yes	82%
No	18%

Oliver Wong

CREDITS

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Prize: Bragging rights

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Winning the contest was all about **percentages**, not total votes...

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2. Overwhelming the negative votes towards competitors


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Robert “RSnake” Hansen’s girlfriend’s co-worker asks him to help her chihuahua “Tiny” win the contest.




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
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RSnake fires up Burp proxy...




Taking the path of least resistance attempts #1 - submits 2,000 votes



Taking the path of least resistance attempts #1 - submits 2,000 votes

The image displays two screenshots of the Burp Suite v1.1 beta interface. The left screenshot shows the 'intercept' tab, where a request to `http://content.coxnewsweb.com:80` is being processed. The request details are visible, including the method `POST /cxn_hon/cxn_hon_photo_vote.php` and various headers. The body of the request is `vote%5Fdata=pos&mediahub%5Fphoto%5Fid=617638&hon%5Fconfig%5Fid=82`. The right screenshot shows the 'sequencer' tab, where a request is selected. The 'identify token in response' dialog is open, showing the response body: `HTTP/1.1 200 OK` followed by headers and a body containing the token `&result=vote&votes_pos=2074&votes_neg=454`. The dialog also includes options for token location (cookie, form field, manual selection) and token start/end positions.

RSnake boosts Tiny into 1st...



“ChooChoo” pwns Tiny with technique #2

During the last minutes of the contest the competition submitted 450+ negative votes, which still made Tiny the winner in total by more than 2:1, however as a percentage of positive to negative, Tiny lost by a landslide.


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Win

Loss!




Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart. Used for protection against bots.



Solving CAPTCHA's for Cash

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
Spammers want to defeat CAPTCHAs to register for free online accounts on Gmail, YahooMail, Windows Live Mail, MySpace, FaceBook, etc. for spam distribution.

As CAPTCHA technology has become more ubiquitous a market has emerged for those who can successfully defeat the security measures in any manner possible.

CAPTCHA solving done in 3 ways...

1) Flawed Implementation

- Not enough entropy in the answers
 - i.e. “what is 4 + 1?”
- The same answers can be replayed multiple times



CAPTCHA Effectiveness Test

- 1) Test should be administered where the human and the server are remote over a network.
- 2) Test should be simple for humans to pass.
- 3) Test should be solvable by humans in less than a several seconds.
- 4) Test should only be solvable by the human to which it was presented.
- 5) Test should be hard for computer to pass
- 6) Knowledge of previous questions, answers, results, or combination thereof should not impact the predictability of following tests.
- 7) Test should not discriminate against humans with visual or hearing impairments.
- 8) Test should not possess a geographic, cultural, or language bias.

2) OCR

A Low-cost Attack on a Microsoft CAPTCHA

“Our attack has achieved a segmentation success rate of 92%, and this implies that the MSN scheme can be broken with an overall (segmentation and then recognition) success rate of more than 60%.”

A Low-cost automated attacks on Yahoo CAPTCHAs

“Our second attack achieved a segmentation success rate of around 33.4% on this latest scheme. As a result, we estimate that this scheme could be broken with an overall success rate of about 25.9%. Our results show that spammers never had to employ cheap human labour to pass Yahoo CAPTCHAs. Rather, they could rely on low-cost automated attacks. ”

Jeff Yan and Ahmad Salah El Ahmad

School of Computing Science, Newcastle University, England

Low-cost automated attacks on Yahoo CAPTCHAs
<http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/jeff.yan/yahoo.htm>

A Low-cost Attack on a Microsoft CAPTCHA
<http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/jeff.yan/msn.htm>

3) Mechanical Turk / "The Turk"


Target Website



Content Website (porn, games, etc.)



User



PC stripper helps spam to spread
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7067962.stm>

Solving and creating captchas with free porn
<http://www.boingboing.net/2004/01/27/solving-and-creating.html>

Solving CAPTCHAs for Cash
<http://hackers.org/blog/20070427/solving-captchas-for-cash/>

web visum (vision, in latin) is your eyes for the web
<http://www.webvisum.com/>



RSnake is contacted by a Romanian CAPTCHA Solver...

*“300-500 CAPTCHAs per person per hour. The clients pay between **\$9-15 per 1000 CAPTCHAs solved**. The team works around 12 hours a day per person. That means they can solve somewhere around 4800 CAPTCHAs per day per person, and, depending on how hard the CAPTCHAs are, that can run you around **\$50 per day per person** (his estimate).”*



Solving CAPTCHAs for Cash
<http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20070427/solving-captchas-for-cash/>

web visum (vision, in latin) is your eyes for the web
<http://www.webvisum.com/>



Hello,

I'm from VietNam

*We have a group with 20 person. We working some site
rabort, rubl, look...*

*Our rate just **4\$ for per 1000 captcha solved.***

We hope work you

*Best Regard,
QuangHung*



Hi!!! Hope you are doing well. We the leading Data processing company in Bangladesh. Presently we are processing 100000+ captcha per day by our 30 operators. We have a well set up and We can give the law rate for the captcha solving.

*Our rate **\$2 per 1000** captcha.yahoo,hotmail,mayspace,gmail, facebook etc.*

We just wanna make the relationship for long terms. can we go forward? Thank you.

*Best Regards
shakilur rahaman shohe*



Babu Says:

Dear Sir,

***I am interested to work for data entry. Please call me
0171-3335000***

Everyone forgets their password(s) eventually and to ease customer support costs, password recovery features are heavily relied upon.

What is the manufacturer/model of the first vehicle you drove?

What is the name of your best friend in high school?

What is your favorite childhood book?

What is your favorite city to visit?

What is your favorite fabric?

What is your favorite garden tool?

What is your favorite holiday?

What is your favorite household tool?

What is your favorite perennial flower?

What is your favorite school subject?

What is your favorite vacation place?

What is your high school's mascot?

What was the name of your first cat?

What was the name of your first dog?

What was the name of your first pet?

Who is your favorite author of all time?

Who is your favorite college professor?

Who is your favorite high school teacher?

Who is your favorite historical figure?

Who was your first employer?

Recover someone else's password - it's a feature!

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Who was your first employer?

Hijack a Sprint user's accounts

With just a
cell phone
number...

Sprint ahead

Shop | My Sprint | Digital Lounge | Support

Answer the following questions

Please answer the questions below to verify that you are the account holder and to protect you from identity theft and fraud. Once you answer the questions correctly, you'll be able to...

Where do these questions come from?

Sprint has partnered with a verification company that has developed an anti-fraud tool that will assist you as the account holder. The questions that you will be asked to answer are randomly generated through information regulated by Federal Laws. This anti-fraud tool has been used by numerous industries, including after Katrina, to successfully prevent identity theft and fraud.

Which of the following vehicle makes has been registered at the following address: [redacted]

- Lotus
- Honda
- Lamborghini
- Fiat
- None of the above

“change their billing address, order a whole bunch of cellphones sent to a drop location, and leave the victim paying the bill. There's also the stalker's wet dream: add GPS tracking to their cellphone and secretly watch their every movement from any computer.”

Answer the following questions

Please answer the questions below to verify that you are the account holder and to help us to protect your account from identity theft and fraud. Once you answer the questions correctly, you'll be able to create your PIN.

Where do these questions come from?

Sprint has partnered with a verification company that has developed an anti-fraud tool that will ask a short series of questions to verify you as the account holder. The questions that you will be asked to answer are randomly generated through the use of publicly available information regulated by Federal Laws. This anti-fraud tool has been used by numerous industries, as well as the Federal Government after Katrina, to successfully prevent identity theft and fraud.

Which of the following vehicle makes has been registered at the following address [REDACTED]

- Lotus
- Honda
- Lamborghini
- Fiat
- None of the above

Which of the following people have resided with you or used the same address as you at [REDACTED]

- Jerry Steff III
- Ralph Argen
- Jerome Ponicki
- John Pace
- None of the above

In which of the following cities have you NEVER lived or used in your address?

- Longmont
- North Hollywood
- Genoa
- Butte
- All of the above

Change Billing Information Signed on as [redacted] | Sign Off

Account number: [redacted] Account Administrator: [redacted]

To change your billing address or contact information, update the fields below:

If you want your billing statements sent to a different address than where the phones are used, please [contact Customer Care](#). This may affect how you are taxed. [Explanation of Taxes](#)

*Due to billing cycles, your changes may not be reflected on your next invoice.

Billing and Contact Information

* Indicates Required Information

Account name: [redacted]
 Order Number/Attn: [redacted]
 * Street Address or PO Box: [redacted]
 Suite, Apt. or Department: [redacted]
 * City: WASHINGTON
 * State: DC
 * ZIP Code: 20012
 * Contact phone number: 202 [redacted]
 * Contact name: [redacted]
 Email Address: [redacted]

Reset

[Add a phone to share minutes](#)

[Change Plan Add-ons](#)

Add-ons for [redacted]

- Cellular Call Detail Included
- [Unlimited Nights Weekends-7pm](#) Included
- [Picture Mail](#) \$5.0
- [America Expanded Voice Coverag](#) Included

Check the options you want to add to your

- [Mobile Locator™](#) \$9.99
- [1000 SMS Text Messages](#) \$5.00
- [Sprint Family Locator Service](#) \$9.99
- [300 SMS Text Messages](#) \$5.00
- [Unlimited SMS Text Messaging](#) \$15.00


Save changes

Close




Add-ons > Mobile Locator™ Signed on as [redacted]

[Back to the Phone & Plan landing page](#)




See where people are. In real time.

Contact Employees Anytime. Anywhere. With Web-based Mobile Locator™ you can see the current location of an employee's phone. In real time. In the advanced mapping display on your PC. It's the information you need to provide superior customer service, avoid delays and increase productivity. Or simply enjoy peace of mind.




Email preferred over secret questions



Heavy WebMail Adoption

Provider	No. of Users (mm)
Yahoo Mail	262.2
Hotmail/Live	256.4
Gmail	87.1
AOL Mail	48.9
QQ.com	31.4



China-based online “Password Recovery” services: You pay them to hack into “your” account.

300 Yuan (\$43) to break an overseas mailbox password,
with 85% probability of success.

200 Yuan (\$29) to break a domestic mailbox password,
with 90% probability of success.

1000 Yuan (\$143) to break a company’s mailbox
password (no success rate given).

Also on the menu:

passwords for 163, 126, QQ, Yahoo, Sohu, Sina, TOM,
Hotmail, MSN...etc.



Mailbox passwords for sale, Chinese hacker business or scam?

<http://www.thedarkvisitor.com/2008/04/mailbox-passwords-for-sale-chinese-hacker-business-or-scam/>

<http://news.cnnb.com.cn/system/2008/04/14/005548493.shtml>

HIRE 2 HACK

LOVE ALL ~ TRUST ME

Block



Transparent service, safe.
We are a bunch of freelance
result-oriented ; and probab
other humbugs trying to pres
wasting time faking it, we jus

Email Password Recovery

Hire2Hack crack all Yahoo! , MSN, Hotmail, AOL & Gmail passwords in less than 24 hours. Tell us if someone cracks faster, and we give give you a candy !!

Online Infidelity Investigations

Vengeance, is a man's right. Get to the

Your Name	
Your Email Address	
Confirm your Email Address	
Your Country	
<input type="radio"/> Most Urgent <input type="radio"/> Urgent <input type="radio"/> Just do it whenever you can	
Victim Name	
Victim Email Address	
Confirm Victim Email Address	
Victim Victim Country	
Victim Language	
Optional Information :-	
How you know us	
Your Yahoo! Chat ID	
Your MSN Chat ID	
Preferred Mode of Payment	
Bonus offered (if any)	
Any Instructions ?	
Submit your Order	

Variable project-based pricing \$150 (USD) minimum. They accept Western Union.

Hire to Hack
<http://www.hire2hack.net/>

Username are valuable too, especially when they're email addresses.

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Phishers use login and password recovery screens to mine for valid email addresses using timing attacks.

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Unfortunately the only tool we have to fight against timing attacks is time. And time = money.


eCoupons are used during online checkout. The customer enters a unique id and a discount is applied to their order.



Monetizing eCoupons

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**A large online retailer offered an
eCoupon program...**

A large online retailer offered an eCoupon program...

- Coupon (i.e. AmEx) worth between a couple dollars and several hundred contained 16-digit IDs where large sections were static and the rest sequential.

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
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- Initially only 3 coupons were allowed to be applied to a single order, until the program became popular with larger orders and the restriction was removed.
- Someone developed a script trying thousands of possible valid coupon IDs. **Orders of merchandise worth over \$50,000 were bought for mere dollars where 200 or more individual coupons applied.**



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Coupons are not currency, only a tool for marketing. Instead investigated by the Secret Service and now they face counts of mail fraud.

"Micro-deposits" of a random few cents (\$0.01 - \$2.00) are used to verify financial accounts and routing numbers are correct and to verify that customers received it.



Real life: Office Space Hack

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Michael Largent, 22, of Plumas Lake, California allegedly...


Opened 58,000 brokerage accounts
“used fake names, addresses and Social Security numbers for the brokerage accounts. Largent allegedly favored cartoon characters for the names, including Johnny Blaze, King of the Hill patriarch Hank Hill, and Rusty Shackelford. That last name is doubly-fake -- it's the alias commonly used by the paranoid exterminator Dale Gribble on King of the Hill.”

Linked to a dozen online bank accounts including Capital One, Bancorp Metabank, Greendot and Skylight.



Michael Largent allegedly used a script to open 58,000 online brokerage accounts in the names of cartoon characters, and other aliases.
 Hank Hill courtesy Fox Broadcasting





Google's Checkout: \$8,225

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E*TRADE, Schwab: \$50,225

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Profited using pre-paid debit cards

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**Faces four counts each of computer fraud, wire fraud
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
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
Snared by the U.S. Patriot Act

Application Service Providers (ASP) offer hosting for banks, credit unions, and other financial services companies. ASPs are attractive targets because instead of hacking a single financial institution, an attacker could compromise dozens/hundreds/thousands.



“You’re a hacker!?” Can you hack a bank?”

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The System

- An ASP provides hosting for banks, credit unions, and other financial services companies. ASPs are attractive targets because **instead of focusing on one back at a time**, an attack could **compromise dozens/hundreds/thousands at a time** with the same vulnerability.
- The banking application had three important URL parameters: **client_id**, **bank_id**, and **acct_id**. To the ASP, each of their clients has a unique ID, each potentially with several different banking websites, and each bank having any number of customer bank accounts.

http://website/app.cgi?client_id=10&bank_id=100&acct_id=1000

How to hack 600 banks...

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No notion of “authorization”

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First pass at the fix *commented out the error in the HTML*, while the “real” fix would go in at some unspecified time in the future.

http://website/app.cgi?client_id=10&bank_id=100&acct_id=1000

Reverse Money Transfer

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Normal: \$10,000 from Account A to Account B

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$$A = A - (\$10,000)$$

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Negative: -\$10,000 from Account A to Account B

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Normal: \$10,000 from Account A to Account B

$$A = A - (\$10,000)$$

$$B = B + (\$10,000)$$

Negative: -\$10,000 from Account A to Account B

$$A = A - (-\$10,000)$$

Reverse Money Transfer

Normal: \$10,000 from Account A to Account B

$$A = A - (\$10,000)$$

$$B = B + (\$10,000)$$

Negative: -\$10,000 from Account A to Account B


$$A = A - (-\$10,000)$$

$$B = B + (-\$10,000)$$

*“Back-end business controls
will prevent these issues.”
ASP Security Contact*

*“Back-end business controls
will prevent these issues.”
ASP Security Contact*

a few weeks later...



\$*****2.00


For Credit to Account #


TWO DOLLARS AND NO CENTS

VOID AFTER 90 DAYS

WH TEST
3003 BUNKER HILL LN
SANTA CLARA CA 95054-1144

[Handwritten Signature]





a couple months later...

\$70,000 illegally wired to an eastern european country.



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Money not recoverable.



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ASP lost a customer.



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Other customers affected: unknown



People order things online, then change their minds, and cancel.



When back-end order cancellation procedures are a little too slow

People order things online, then change their minds, and cancel.



Woman admits fleecing shopping network of more than \$412,000

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/10/30/website_fraud_guilty_plea/

<http://consumerist.com/consumer/crime/woman-exploited-bug-on-qvc-website-to-steal-over-400k-in-merchandise-317045.php>

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“QVC became aware of the problem after being contacted by two people who bought the items, still in QVC packaging, on the online auction site.”



Pleaded guilty in federal court to wire fraud.



FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
PROTECTING AMERICA'S CONSUMERS

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Protección del Consumidor en Español

Facts for Consumers [Email](#) [PDF Format](#)

Unordered Merchandise

...You respond to an advertisement offering a free "trial" pair of pantyhose. To your surprise, you receive four pair with a bill.

...You receive a pocket knife that you never ordered. Despite your objections, the company continues to send you notices demanding payment and threatening your credit rating.

What do you do when you receive merchandise that you didn't order? According to the Federal Trade Commission, you don't have to pay for it. Federal laws prohibit mailing unordered merchandise to consumers and then demanding payment.

Here are some questions and answers about dealing with unordered merchandise.

Q. Am I obligated to return or pay for merchandise I never ordered?

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A. No. If you receive merchandise that you didn't order, you have a legal right to keep it as a free gift.

Q. What should I do if the unordered merchandise I received was the result of an honest shipping error?

A. Write the seller and offer to return the merchandise, provided the seller pays for postage and handling. Give the seller a specific and reasonable amount of time (say 30 days) to pick up the merchandise or arrange to have it returned at no expense to you. Tell the seller that you reserve the right to keep the merchandise or dispose of it after the specified time has passed.

Q. Is there any merchandise that may be sent legally without my consent?

A. Yes. You may receive samples that are clearly marked free, and merchandise from charitable organizations asking for contributions. You may keep such shipments as free gifts.

Q. Is there any way to protect myself from shippers of unordered merchandise?

A. When you participate in sweepstakes or order goods advertised as "free," "trial," or "unusually low priced," be cautious. Read all the fine print to determine if you are joining a "club," with regular purchasing or notification obligations. Keep a copy of the advertisement or catalog that led you to place the order, too. This may make it easier to contact the company if a problem arises.

Online merchants and advertisers enlist the services of affiliate networks to drive traffic and/or customers to their websites in exchange for a share of the revenue generate.



Affiliate Scams

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
The players


Merchant: Pays commissions to affiliates for customer clicks, account sign-ups, purchases, etc.

Affiliate: Collects commissions for driving customers towards merchants in the form of cost per-click (CPC) or cost per-acquisition (CPA).

Customer: The person who buys stuff or signs-up for promotions.

Affiliate Network: Technology framework connecting and monitoring the merchant, affiliate, and customer.





The way it's supposed to work..

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1. Affiliate signs-up with an affiliate network and places special links on their web page(s)

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2. When users click the link their browser is sent through affiliate network where they receive a special tracking cookie and then redirected to the merchant page.

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```
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```

3. If the customer buys something within X time period (i.e. affiliate cookie still exists) the affiliate receives a commission.

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Using effective SEO tactics...



GOOGLE INC.
 1600 AMPHITHEATRE PARKWAY
 MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA 94043

Cheque No:
 Client No:

Date: SEPTEMBER 27, 2005

ShoeMoney.com

Amount: USD *****132,994.97

Pay to the order of

To

LINCOLN NE 68516

890 GLEN FOREST DR
 UNITED STATES

Or Order

Sum of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETY-FOUR AND 97/100 U.S.
 DOLLARS *****

Payable at

CITIBANK, N.A.
 THROUGH CITIBANK (NEW YORK STATE)
 ABA 2220 0008

For CITIBANK TEL FINANCIAL SERVICES PLC

William Neal
 Authorized Signature

Cheque No:
Client No:

Date: SEPTEMBER 27, 2005

Amount: USD *****132,994.97

Or Order

FOR CITIBANK TEL FINANCIAL SERVICES PLC

William Mul

Authorized Signature

Cheque No:
Client No:

Date: SEPTEMBER 27, 2005


Amount: USD *****132,994.97

Or Order

FOR CITIBANK TEL FINANCIAL SERVICES PLC

William Akul

Authorized Signature



GOOGLE INC.

1600 AMPHITHEATRE PARKWAY
MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA 94043

Cheque No: [REDACTED]

Client No: [REDACTED]

Date: FEBRUARY 27, 2006

Amount: CAD901,733.84

Pay against this cheque

To: PLENTYOFFISH [REDACTED]

Or Order

The sum of NINE HUNDRED ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE AND 84/100 CANADIAN DOLLAR

For: CITIBANK IRL FINANCIAL SERVICES PLC

William Mul

Authorized Signature

CITIBANK CANADA 125 FRONT ST. W
TOR, ONT M5J2M3 A/C 2183509007
TRANSIT NO. 00082-260

Cheque No: [REDACTED]
Client No: [REDACTED]

Date: FEBRUARY 27, 2006

Amount: CAD901,733.84

Or Order

.....
84/100 CANADIAN DOLLAR
.....

For CITIBANK IRL FINANCIAL SERVICES PLC

Walter Mul
Authorized Signature

Cheque No: [REDACTED]
Client No: [REDACTED]

Date: FEBRUARY 27, 2006

Amount: CAD *901,733.84




Or Order

.....
54/100 CANADIAN DOLLAR
.....

For CITIBANK IRL FINANCIAL SERVICES PLC

Walter Mul
Authorized Signature

"It was a check for 2 months because the first check they sent was so big it was rejected by his bank."



Cookie-Stuffing Circa 2002

Nothing besides pesky affiliate networks terms of service requires the user to actually “click a link” to be cookied with an affiliate ID.

Instead of:

```
<a href="http://AffiliateNetwork/p?  
program=50&affiliate_id=100/">really cool product!</a>
```

Use:

```

```

or:

```
<iframe src="http://AffiliateNetwork/p?  
program=50&affiliate_id=100/" width="0" height="0"></iframe>
```

Invisible!

Aggressive affiliates figure out they can post their code anywhere online and not just on their own websites (message boards, guest books, social networks, etc).


The image displays three screenshots of websites, illustrating how affiliate code is placed on various online platforms:

- Go Fuck Yourself.com:** Shows a banner for 'WebCash Maker' with a '50% OFF' offer, placed on a page with a 'Go Fuck Yourself.com' header.
- Black Hat World:** Shows a banner for 'Cookie Stuffer' with a 'Crash Support' link, placed on a page with a 'Black Hat World' header.
- SEO Black Hat Forum:** Shows a banner for 'Once You Do Black You Never Go Back! Sign Up Today!' placed on a forum page titled 'SEO Black Hat SEO Forum'.

Aggressive affiliates figure out they can post their code anywhere online and not just on their own websites (message boards, guest books, social networks, etc).



By 2005, Merchants and Affiliate Networks got wise to cookie stuffing, start monitoring referers and conversion rates, and began kicking out suspicious affiliates.



Cookie-Stuffing Circa 2007

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Affiliates start posting their code on SSL pages.

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Bottom line: No referer is sent to the affiliate to be tracked. FYI: Not every browser behaves this way, but there are many other methods to do the same using meta-refreshes and JavaScript.


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Bottom line: No referer is sent to the affiliate to be tracked. FYI: Not every browser behaves this way, but there are many other methods to do the same using meta-refreshes and JavaScript.

2008: DNS-Rebinding, GIFAR, Flash malware



Gaming customer referral incentives

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
1. A merchants marketing promotion pays affiliates \$5 - 50 commission for each new user the refer who registers by entering a new credit card number. Often it's not required that the user buy anything, perhaps only "participate".

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3. Sources say tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of dollars have been gleaned using this method in several different marketing promotions.



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3. Days or weeks later the credit card owner receives the items, reports the errors, disputes the purchase, and ships the item back. Should the merchant wish to take back their commission it is usually too late because the affiliate has been paid and long gone with the money.

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Making Millions by Trading on Semi-public Information

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Getting the word out...

Business Wire provides a service where registered website users receive a stream of up-to-date press releases. Press releases are funneled to Business Wire by various organizations, which are sometimes embargoed temporarily because the information may affect the value of a stock.

Press release files are uploaded to the Web server (Business Wire), *but not linked*, until the embargo is lifted. At such time, the press release Web pages are linked into the main website and users are notified with URLs similar to the following:

http://website/press_release/08/29/2007/00001.html

http://website/press_release/08/29/2007/00002.html

http://website/press_release/08/29/2007/00003.html

Before granting read access to the press release Web page, the system ensures the user is properly logged-in.



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And, while links might not yet exist because the embargo was in place, it didn't mean a user couldn't guess at the filename and gain access to the file. This method worked because **the only security check Business Wire conducted was to ensure the user was properly logged-in, nothing more.**



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According to the SEC, which began an investigation, Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann profited over **\$8 million** by trading on the information they obtained.



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
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- The Times speculates that the DoJ has simply deemed the case not worth pursuing - probably due to the difficulties involved in gaining cooperation from local authorities to capture criminals in Ukraine.

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Passive intelligence gathering

When online purchases are made, customers are usually provided an order tracking ID - often (semi)-sequential.

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
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
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
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HTTP requests appear legitimate, but active attacks will
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Solving CAPTCHAs - \$ four figures



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
Manipulating payment systems - \$ five figures



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
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
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
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
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
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
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




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
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
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Thank You!

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